In the remote attestation procedures of confidential computing, the verifier (often called attestation service) plays a critical role in the attestation mechanism to verify the evidence and produce attestation results. However, in the current implementation, attestation services are designed and implemented as trusted components in the remote attestation architecture. That is to say, the relying party who usually owns the secrets has to trust these attestation services provided by cloud service providers, which breaks the promise of TEE on excluding cloud service providers from the trust boundary. Thus, a critical question emerges: can we exclude attestation services from the trust boundary? In this session, we will present a possible solution to implementing a trustless attestation service for TEEs. By leveraging recent developments in zero-knowledge proofs, the proposed attestation service can be deployed in an untrusted environment that is out of the trust boundary while providing provable attestation results.

The recent shift in regulatory demands, which are aimed at fostering an understanding of the systemic risks, is pushing large online platforms and search engines towards greater transparency. Some regulations require these companies to grant privileged data access to vetted researchers. However, this could potentially lead to unintentional misuse or leaks of user privacy. It is very hard, yet important, to design a platform that strives to balance transparency with robust protections to mitigate these privacy risks. This session will discuss a solution that leverages trusted execution environments (TEEs) in the cloud to balance between transparency and user privacy. We demonstrate how TEEs can provide data confidentiality and execution integrity to both data owners and data scientists. We will also discuss future opportunities and other use cases of the solution.